





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23 MAY 66




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
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24 MAY 66



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
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27 MAY 66




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INCLOSURE # 16

28 MAY 66




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INCLOSURE 17

29 MAY 66

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


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
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INCLOSURE 20

1 JUNE 66




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
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2 JUNE 67




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


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


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HEADQUARTERS
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96490

15 June 1966

AVCARLT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Crazy Horse)

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96490

1. Name and type of operation: Operation Crazy Horse. An attack to relieve forces in contact followed by a search and destroy operation.
2. Control and Command Headquarters: 1st (Air Mobile) Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
3. Dates of Operation: 141300 May 1966 to 051800 June 1966.
4. Location: Hill Mass of the Vinh Thanh Valley (BR6160) and Soui Ca Valley, Central Binh Dinh Province, Republic of Vietnam.
5. Intelligence. 1st Air Cavalry Division was engaged with elements of the 2d VC Regt (AKA QUYET CHIEN) in the hill mass east of the Vinh Thanh Valley. Captured documents during initial contact indicated that the 95th and 97th Battalions; C-14th Company, 32d Arty Battalion (120mm Mortar), and the D26 Local Forces Company were engaged. Further information suggested that the VC would attack the CIDG camp in the Vinh Thanh Valley in celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday on May 19. At the termination of Operation Crazy Horse the 95th and 97th Battalions were rendered ineffective. Captured documents indicate that C-14 Company, 32d Arty Battalion (120mm mortar) were in the area, but not encountered by the 1st Cavalry Division. Final summary for the operation: 507 VC KIA (BC), 381 VC KIA (Est), 175 VC WIA (Est), 28 VC captured, and 114 suspects detained. The Division also located several rice and ammo caches, resulting in 90,025 lbs rice, 20,875 lbs salt, and a large quantity of rice being captured.
6. Mission: 1st Airmobile Brigade conducts assault into the mountains east of the Vinh Thanh Valley to destroy enemy forces in combat and conduct search and destroy operations and to pursue the enemy regardless of his direction of movement.
7. Execution:
 - a. During the first two days of the operation, 14 and 15 May, Division Artillery units did not actively participate in the operation as no cavalry troops were committed to the area. However, Division Artillery did have tentative planning information and alert batteries were oriented for possible commitment to that area, on order.
 - b. On 16 May, Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry air assaulted to LZ Hereford (BR660628) and Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry assaulted into LZ Horse (BR691632). Battery A, 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery fired a preparation on each LZ. Only light contact was established upon landing but by 1700 hours the Cavalry troops were heavily engaged with an estimated battalion size force. Elements

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of all three batteries of the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery fired close defensive fires in support of the LZ's and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery fired in defensive concentrations and will adjust missions.

c. On 17 May, the initial elements of the 1st Brigade were engaged in offensive operations with light to heavy enemy contact in the vicinity of LZ Hereford and LZ Horse. 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry was committed to the operational area at 0700 hours conducting an air move to LZ Hereford to reinforce Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry and Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry. At 0715 hours, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, was alerted for commitment and conducted an air assault using troopers ladders to establish blocking positions via LZ Horse and a landing zone via BR690652. Headquarters 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery and Battery B, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery entered Operation Crazy Horse and were airlifted to the Vinh Thanh Valley via BR613598 closing at 1750 hours.

d. During the period 18 - 20 May, all units continued sweep and destroy operations with the main effort being the push of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry toward the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry positions. Light to heavy contact was encountered in the vicinity of BR700505, BR697632, and BR665628. The 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry deployed to position Savoy (BR612604) as a reaction force and 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry continued security of the 1st Brigade and artillery complex at LZ Cobra (BR595600). On 20 May, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry was detached from the 3d Brigade and attached to the 1st Brigade effective 201200 May, and was committed to the operational area closing in LZ Horse at 1600 hours. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was released from 1st Brigade control and returned to Camp Redoliff.

e. On 21 May, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry conducted an air assault into LZ Mortimer, (BR698685) with two companies. The remaining two companies swept north toward Mortimer. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, and 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry continued search and destroy operations into the Soui Ca and Crows Foot Area with light to heavy contact reported. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry reported heavy contact via BR710635.

f. On 22 May, all 1st Brigade elements continued search and destroy operations northeast of the Vinh Thanh Valley into the Soui Ca and Crows Foot Areas with light to moderate contact reported.

g. On 23 May, major redeployment was conducted as the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry moved from LZ Horse to LZ Steer (BR720645) and 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry occupied LZ's Corral (BR735700) and Harvard (BR705723). No contact was established.

h. On 24 May, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry moved to LZ Golf (BR731550) in the southeastern sector of the AO while the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry moved to positions in the vicinity of LZ Clemson (BR730669) and LZ Smith (BR770650). These movements effectively encircled the enemy force in the mountains east of the Vinh Thanh Valley. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry occupied positions on the north and northeast; the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry on the east and southeast; and the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry on the south. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry continued to screen the valley itself. The Brigade maintained these positions through 27 May. Limited sweeps were conducted on 24 and 25 May with light sporadic contact.

i. On 26 May, four CIDG companies air assaulted into the center of the area and began sweeping toward blocking positions established by 1st Cavalry units. Light resistance was encountered via BR679647 by one CIDG company and at 1800 hours, Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry moved by air to reinforce the CIDG personnel at LZ Monkey (BR679647). One aircraft was downed on the LZ after only two loads had landed and all other aircraft with the remainder of Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry were turned back to LZ Corral. The downed aircraft completely blocked the one ship LZ.

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j. On 27 May, Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry and Reconnaissance Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry conducted a heliborne assault into LZ Mortimer (BR695685) and conducted a sweep south reporting a medical cache and ammunition find in the vicinity of BR697671. All other brigade elements continued operations in sector.

k. On 28 and 29 May, another general redistribution of forces took place as additional CIDG and Republic of Korea troops joined the operation. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry moved back into the mountains northeast of the Vinh Thanh Valley. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry displaced into LZ Corral which had been vacated by the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry and the 2d ROK Cavalry Battalion assumed positions in the vicinity of LZ Colt (BR745517). All units then set up blocking positions within their sectors and continued to conduct local search and destroy missions. No contact was reported on the 28th and only light contact was reported on the 29th.

l. During the period 30 May to 4 June, all units continued to conduct small unit patrolling and establish ambush sites within their assigned sectors. On 31 May, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry deployed to Camp Radcliff. On 1 June the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry redeployed to LZ Hotel (BR806507) to secure the artillery batteries and continue operations in the southern portion of the Soui Ca Valley. Only light sporadic contact was made during the period.

m. On 5 June all units redeployed to the base camp terminating the operation.

n. Battery position occupied during the operation (See Inclosure 1, Position Area Overlay).

<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATE OCCUPIED</u>	<u>MEANS OF OCCUPATION</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>DIST</u>
2/17	Hq	BR612604 (LZ Savoy)	24 May - 1 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	Hq	BR457480 (Camp Radcliff)	1 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	A	BR613604 (LZ Savoy)	24 May - 1 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	A	BR621511 (Highway 19)	1 Jun	Surface	N/A	65 Km
	B	BR613598 (LZ Cobra)	16 May - 2 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
2/19	B	BR457482 (Camp Radcliff)	2 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	Hq	BR613598 (LZ Cobra)	17 May - 5 Jun	Air	3	23 Km
	Hq	BR473463 (Camp Radcliff)	5 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	A	BR613598 (LZ Cobra)	18 - 24 May	Air	13	23 Km
	A	BR745517 (LZ Colt)	24 - 28 May	Air	14	15 Km
	A	BR610595 (LZ Cobra)	28 May - 5 Jun	Air	11	15 Km
	A	BR468464 (Camp Radcliff)	5 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	B	BR610601 (LZ Cobra)	17 - 20 May	Surface	N/A	10 Km
	B	BR806587 (LZ Hotel)	20 May - 5 Jun	Air	13	30 Km
	B	BR464467 (Camp Radcliff)	5 Jun	Air	11	30 Km
	C	BR613598 (LZ Cobra)	13-21 May	Air	13	23 Km
	C	BR734700 (LZ Corral)	21 May - 3 Jun	Air	14	15 Km
	C	BR464467 (Camp Radcliff)	3 Jun	Air	17	35 Km

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15 June 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Crazy Horse)

<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATES OCCUPIED</u>	<u>MEANS OF OCCUPATION</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>DIST</u>
3/18	Hq	BR612603 (LZ Savoy)	24 May - 3 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	Hq	BR462483 (Camp Radcliff)	3 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	B	BR641506	16 - 17 May	Surface	N/A	20 Km
	B	BR619561	17 - 20 May	Surface	N/A	6 Km
	B	BR616633	20 - 24 May	Surface	N/A	6 Km
	D	BR613606 (LZ Savoy)	24 May - 5 Jun	Surface	N/A	3 Km
	B	BR464493 (Camp Radcliff)	5 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	D	BR612598 (LZ Cobra)	24 May - 3 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	D	BR472495 (Camp Radcliff)	3 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km
	1/30	C	BR614605 (LZ Cobra)	19 - 21 May	Surface	N/A
C		BR936466 (Phu Cat)	21 May	Surface	N/A	27 Km
C		BR805595 (LZ Hotel)	21 May - 5 Jun	Air	9 CH47 4 CH54	12 Km
C		BR933467 (Phu Cat)	5 Jun	Air	7 CH47 4 CH54	12 Km
Div Arty		Fwd CP	BR613593 (LZ Cobra)	19 May - 5 Jun	Surface	N/A
	Fwd CP	BR467486 (Camp Radcliff)	5 Jun	Surface	N/A	23 Km

8. Reporting Officers:

- a. William F. Brand Jr., Col, Commanding, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery.
- b. Francis J. Bush, Lt Col, Commanding, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105mm)(Abn)
- c. Norman P. Chandler, Lt Col, Commanding, 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm)(Towed)
- d. Morris J. Brady, Lt Col, Commanding, 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery, (Aerial)
- e. Charles L. Zolner, Lt Col, Commanding, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175)(SP)
- f. Charles C. Wigner, Lt Col, Commanding, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm)(Towed)
- g. David L. Carson, Major, Commanding, Battery E, 82d Artillery (Aviation)

9. Task Organization

- a. 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (+): DS 1st Brigade
- b. 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (-): GSR, attach one battery to 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery effective 19 May; effective 24 May 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (-) GSR 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery; effective 1 Jun attach one battery to 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery.

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c. 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery: GS; reinforce 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery with one battery 8th effective 19 May; effective 24 May 3d Battalion 18th Artillery (-) GS; effective 1 Jun GS, reinforce 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery with one battery 8th.

d. 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery: GSR, reinforce 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery with one battery.

e. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery: attached to 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery; GS, reinforcing 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery effective 190900 May 66.

f. Battery E, 82d Artillery: GS, provide one DS section to 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery.

g. Battery B, 29th Artillery: GS, attach one section to 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery.

10. Narrative Summary: Operation Crazy Horse was characterized by the extensive use of artillery firepower for landing preparations, reconnaissance by fire, saturation H&I fires and close support missions. Throughout the operation, artillery was positioned to permit the massing of fires on lucrative targets utilizing the TOT method of attack. This was accomplished with very few artillery displacements. After the initial artillery positions were selected and occupied, only three additional positions were used to support the entire operation. The operation provided one of the few opportunities for an area to be searched by the infantry after the artillery had fired into it. The results were evidence of enemy casualties and damage to VC installations. Indications that our H&I programs hurt the VC was revealed by a VCC who was captured during a VC attack on LZ Cobra who stated that the attack was designated primarily as revenge for casualties suffered from H&I fires.

The reconnaissance by fire technique was used more during this operation than in any previous operation. It is believed that the close fire support technique, together with the outstanding coordination of the supported arms, attributed greatly to the increase of the number of enemy killed. The possibility of the Vinh Thanh Valley Special Forces Camp being overrun on 19 May brought about an intensive H&I program and massed fire TOT missions on a scale which has not been achieved since Operation Masher/White Wing.

A highlight in artillery displacement was accomplished on 27 and 28 May 1966, when ROK artillery was moved for the first time in Vietnam by helicopter. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery instructed the ROK, 61st Artillery Battalion (105)(Towed) on the proper method of moving by CH47 aircraft. Under the guidance of Battery A personnel the ROK 61st Artillery Battalion was moved from their base camp area to LZ Colt (BR745518) by CH47 aircraft.

11. Supporting Forces.

a. Tactical Air Support was available throughout the operation for both preplanned and immediate requests (See Incl 2).

b. General supporting forces which joined the operation and conducted operations jointly with the 1st Air Cavalry Division were the 2d Battalion, 1st Regiment, Capital ROK Division; 4 companies of CIDG Forces from the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp; and elements of the 22d ARVN Division.

12. Results:

a. Enemy Losses (Credited to Artillery):

	<u>2/19</u>	<u>2/17</u>	<u>2/20</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) KIA BC	75	33	62	170
(2) KIA (Est)	23	25	140	188

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Crazy Horse)

	<u>2/19</u>	<u>2/17</u>	<u>2/20</u>	<u>Total</u>
(3) WIA	0	0	0	0
(4) Equipment	0	0	0	0
(5) Structures	0	0	51	51
(6) Other	0	0	*13 AW 19 Sniper Positions	13 AW 19 Sniper Positions

*Silenced and four secondary explosions were observed.

b. Friendly Losses (Artillery Units Only)

	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Non-Combat</u>	<u>Cause</u>
(1) KIA	2	0	AW Fire
(2) WIA	4	0	S/A Fire, Mortars
(3) MIA	0	0	
(4) Equipment	1 UH-1H Damaged		Received 13 30 caliber hits

13. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply. Since the distance to the operational area from Camp Radcliff was only 25 kilometers, logistical resupply was from the base area. Support Command had a terrific problem in maintaining artillery units with enough ammunition to support their saturation programs. Outstanding service was rendered by the Support Command with all available resources being utilized to maintain an adequate supply of ammunition to the firing units. The backup system of resupply of Class V from the Qui Nhon Support Command by GLOC worked very satisfactorily. Flat bed semi-trailers were delivered daily to units accessible by road and off loaded during the day. Then on the following day, another trailer would be delivered and the empty trailer of the previous day picked up. This marked the first time during an operation that large amounts of 105mm ammunition were received by surface transportation.

b. Artillery communications throughout the operation was outstanding. The use of the KYB-6/TSEC crypto set proved to be highly satisfactory when a relay station was not needed for communication. The KYB-6/TSEC crypto set was used extensively throughout the operation which reduced transmission time for classified information, and enhanced timely and accurate reports and response to classified messages.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. During this operation the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery was assigned the mission of dispersing GS powder from the M-5 riot control agent dispenser. This system is perhaps the least desirable to be used in combat situations since the optimum dispensing technique is at 40 knots airspeed and at an altitude of 75 feet. This flight condition places the helicopter and crew in an extremely vulnerable position to enemy ground fire and the aircraft could easily be lost to light machine guns.

15. Commanders Analysis. The organization for combat of the artillery had no unusual features except for the tremendous amount of reinforcing fires available to the direct support battalion. We will rarely be able to mass that much artillery in support of one brigade (5-105mm batteries, 1-155mm battery, 1 aerial artillery battery, 1-8" howitzer battery, and 1-175mm battery).


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The large amount of artillery coupled with the scheme of maneuver, allowed us to mass artillery on a scale not achieved since Operation Masher/White Wing. Again, surveillance of the impact areas following the TOT's showed that this technique is extremely effective. The reconnaissance by fire technique was used more during this operation than in any previous operation and together with the outstanding coordination of the supported arms attributed greatly to the number of enemy killed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



PAUL G. MILREE
Major, Artillery
Adjutant


4 Inclosures

- 1 - Artillery Position Overlay
- 2 - Summary of TAC Air Support
- 3 - Statistical Summary
- 4 - Infantry Air Assaults

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AN KHE (BR 481450)
15 JUNE 1966

INCLOSURE 1 (ARTILLERY POSITION OVERLAY)
TO AFTER ACTION REPORT (CRAZY HORSE)



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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

SORTIES	GP		NAPALM		FRAGS		WP		CBU		RKTS	RDS	TONS
	RDS	TONS	RDS	TONS	RDS	TONS	RDS	TONS	RDS	TONS			
260	539	254.5	125	45.6	260	48.44	0	0	56	14.0	1044	2024	362.54

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ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

TYPE	HE	WP	ILL	SMK	BEEHIVE	PROP	TOTAL
105mm	53,287	2,648	242	266	0	0	56,443
155mm	7252	109	16	0	0	0	7,377
175mm	1896	0	0	0	0	0	1,896
8"	6950	0	0	0	0	0	6,950
2.75 Rkts	7534	0	0	0	0	0	7,534

FUZE UTILIZATION BY TYPE

	FD	DELAY	TIME	CVT	TOTAL
105mm	78% 43960	20% 11325	1% 317	1% 841	100% 56443
155mm	87% 6452	12% 902	1% 15	0% 8	100% 7377
175mm	60% 1135	40% 757	0% 0	0% 4	100% 1896
8"	61% 4293	38% 2630	0% 0	1% 27	100% 6950
2.75 Rkts	100% 7534	0% 0	0% 0	0% 0	100% 7534

MISSIONS BY TYPE

	PREPS	TOTS	LIVE AIR	TGTS GROUND	OTHER	TOTAL
105mm	22	91	64	115	5511	5803
155mm	1	19	2	0	1519	1541
175mm	2	2	6	0	454	464
8"	3	39	35	0	1359	1432
2.75 Rkt	31	0	76	0	15	122

AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION

	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1B (Rkt)	O-1D	TOTAL
MISSIONS	387	137	971	68	1563
SORTIES	694	320	1959	124	3097
HOURS FLOWN	342.2	133.2	681.2	135.3	1291.9
AIRCRAFT HITS	0	0	6	0	6

Incl 3

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AN KHE (BR 481450)
15 JUNE 1966

ENCLOSURE 4 (INFANTRY AIR ASSAULTS)
TO AFTER ACTION REPORT CRAZY HORSE
REFERENCE: MAP 1:50,000 VIETNAM
SERIES L701, SHEETS 6753 I, II

